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Introduction
Colombia is no exception to the maxim that
geography is destiny. Three Andean mountain
chains slice through a dense tropical landscape
to heights over 5,700 meters, forming disparate
populations with strong regional identities.
This territorial disconnection is exacerbated by a
diffuse population that is linked only by an
inadequate national road network—the prod-
uct of centuries of underinvestment. Two-thirds
of the rural population lacks ready access to
the road network, while rural homes are an aver-
age 2.5 km from an all-season road (“Colombia:
Recent . . . ,” p. 17). The Nukak tribe of the
Amazon region went undiscovered until 1988,
highlighting the degree to which these regions
remain isolated (Politis, p. 39). By the end of
the twentieth century, geographic isolation had
left more than half of the Colombian territory
outside government control (Mundt and Ferris,
p. 5). Although Colombia has sustained an
uninterrupted constitutional rule, these pock-
ets of ungoverned and isolated space continue to
undermine the integrity of the state. Illegal
armed groups have operated with impunity in
these areas since the mid-1940s, threatening
internal security while exposing rural populations
to violence and illegal economic activity (Hud-
son, p. 44). The failure of the central government
to lead with authority complicates the develop-
ment of a cohesive state as these areas are unable
to identify with the nation as a whole. Territo-
rial consolidation (hereafter referred to as “con-
solidation”) targets these isolated and historically
victimized populations in an effort to integrate
them with Colombian society through the com-
mitment of military and civil institutions. Con-
solidation refers to the series of policies designed
to clear security threats from unstable zones,
hold security gains, and execute investments tar-
geted at the social and infrastructural fabric of
rural communities. The goal of consolidation is
the systematic elimination of ungoverned
spaces—a milestone that has eluded the govern-
ment of Colombia since its inception.
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I discuss how the nature of the armed con-
flict in Colombia over the past decade has led to
the need for consolidation as a sustainable
approach to internal security. Prior strategies,
although successful in containing the hemor-
rhaging of peripheral territories, have failed to
address the fundamental sources of armed
violence. I outline the consolidation process,
analyze the effectiveness of a consolidation pilot
project in the Serranía de La Macarena region,
and detail the institutional evolution of con-
solidation agencies. I conclude with a progno-
sis of consolidation policies to date.
The Limitations of Democratic
Security
The contemporary model to recover
ungoverned territories in Colombia is the prod-
uct of an evolution of security strategies that
began with the Seguridad Democrática (Demo-
cratic Security) policy in 2002.1 This policy envi-
sioned regaining control of isolated zones where
the state was historically absent through an
enhanced military and police presence. This
presence would combine security gains with the
eradication of illegal crops to undermine the
financial capacity of illegal armed groups and
thus their ability to control territories (Meza, 
p. 2).
Between 1998 and 2010, the government
of Colombia doubled the size and tripled the
budget of its armed forces (Isacson, p. 3). Dem-
ocratic Security accelerated this buildup, estab-
lishing a permanent police presence in every
Colombian municipality2 by 2004—a symbolic
stage in the incomplete process of eliminating
ungoverned spaces (Moreno). The infusion of
security forces coincided with a 52 percent drop
in the national homicide rate between 2002 and
2010 and a reduction in the total cultivated area
of coca—a key ingredient in the production of
cocaine—by 41 percent between 2001 and 2003
(“Global Study on Homicide”; “Colombia 
Coca . . . 2011”). Widespread military inter-
vention was improving security conditions
and forcing illegal armed groups on the defen-
sive—both strategically and financially.
Plan Patriota, a large-scale military offen-
sive initiated in late 2003, sought to expand
these gains as an element of Democratic Secu-
rity. The plan was a marked shift from the
government habit of neglecting sparsely popu-
lated regions as it targeted guerrilla strongholds
in remote areas of southern Colombia (Isacson,
p. 4). Initial military victories drove guerrillas
from villages that had long been under adver-
sary control, although guerrillas endured the
offensive in the rural areas and roads beyond
these towns where they remain a threat today
(Isacson, p. 4). The cultivation of coca persisted
or shifted to areas that remained ungoverned
and improvements to security were situational
and temporary; violence and illegal economic
activity weathered the offensive.
Although initially effective, Democratic
Security ultimately failed to secure Colom-
bia’s marginalized territories through a purely
militaristic approach. Many towns and villages
remained unprotected despite a security pres-
ence in every municipality. Counternarcotic
gains were short-lived as total coca cultivation
increased by 15 percent between 2003 and 2007
(“Colombia Coca . . . 2011”). Further crop fumi-
gation resulted only in environmental and
economic devastation for farmers with no viable
economic alternatives, food security, or crop
substitution programs. Collateral damage from
aerial fumigation campaigns eliminated any lin-
gering rural support for a state that was both
absent and destructive. Although the threat 
of state failure was erased, control remained
incomplete.
Challenges of Ungoverned Territories
Interrelated issues of violence and illegal
economic activity are amplified by the remote-
ness and inaccessibility of Colombia’s iso-
lated regions. The Mapiripán Massacre of 
1997 illustrates the dangers that result from
weak governance in rural areas.3 Over a five-day
period, the paramilitary massacre of at least
49 unarmed civilians was uncontested by
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1Democratic Security was based on former President
Álvaro Uribe’s National Development Plan for 2002–2006:
Towards a Communitarian State (Mejía et al., p. 3).
2Colombia has a unity system of government in which
decentralized administrative divisions exercise only those
powers granted by the central government. There are 1,122
municipalities (counties) within Colombia that constitute
32 departments (states). Each municipality contains a
center of government that administrates surrounding vil-
lages and towns (“División Político-Administrativa . . .”).
Colombian security forces (“Former Colom-
bian . . .”). Although hundreds managed to
flee the region, telephoned pleas for help by
those who could not escape were ignored by 
corrupt army and police forces (“War without
Quarter . . .”). Even with a security presence
nearby, the government failed to protect the
basic human rights of its citizens. Although the
event was well documented by human rights
groups, it was not until ten years later that
the military leadership was properly convicted
for colluding in the massacre (“Former Colom-
bian . . .”). Whereas paramilitary groups have
been largely demobilized since 2006, succes-
sor groups and guerrillas continue to commit
similar atrocities to exert power and influence
over vulnerable communities.
Geographically isolated areas also pro-
vide optimal conditions for illegal economic
activity and forced displacement. Colombia is
second only to Sudan in the total number of
internal displaced peoples—victims who are typ-
ically small farmers forced from their land by
illegal armed groups (Mundt and Ferris, p. 5).
Beyond an exercise of power, forced displace-
ment strengthens the financial position of
illegal armed groups who utilize confiscated
land to cultivate coca and other lucrative crops
(Mundt and Ferris, p. 5). Of the estimated 5.5
million people who have been displaced as a
result of the endemic violence, 62 percent orig-
inated in rural areas (“Global Statistics”; Garay
et al., p. 4).4 Inaccessible geographies are of
strategic importance to narcotraffickers because
they are insulated from counternarcotic efforts
and displacement can be forced without resist-
ance. Indigenous peoples constitute 12 per-
cent of displaced peoples but less than one
percent of the total population, reinforcing
the disproportional victimization of rural com-
munities (Mundt and Ferris, p. 6). Even when
state control is restored in these areas, numer-
ous factors, including poor land titling, compli-
cate the restitution of lands. By the mid-2000s,
it was clear that a rethinking was needed to
address the alarming side effects of weak gov-
ernment control.
The Consolidation Model
The concept of consolidation centers on
the theory that remote areas are socially and
economically insulated from the rest of the
state, but that reintegration is possible through
targeted and timely investments. The multi-
faceted clear-hold-build strategy of consolida-
tion goes beyond a purely militaristic approach
to coordinate military, police, and civil insti-
tutions in establishing a functional civilian state,
freeing Colombian armed forces from the
responsibility of building a state while waging a
war (Devlin and Chaskel, p. 2).5 Given that secu-
rity forces were already established in every
Colombian municipality, the goal of consoli-
dation was to recover, maintain, and strengthen
this presence in targeted municipalities through
a whole-of-government approach (Mejía et al., 
p. 4).
The three-part strategy begins with the
recovery phase in which military forces, as
sole representatives of the state, contain ille-
gal armed threats. Once a basic level of security
is established, police forces are introduced,
access to justice improved, and quick-impact
infrastructural projects executed as part of the
transition phase. Quick-impact projects, includ-
ing road rehabilitation and construction, are
prioritized through civilian consultation and
completed under military or police protection.
These projects produce the requisite conditions
for economic development while conveying 
the permanence of the state commitment to 
the region. The consultative element of the proj-
ects also improves trust in the state while
engendering a sense of civic responsibility. In
regions centered on the coca trade, eradication
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3Mapiripán is a municipality in the Department of
Meta that borders the consolidation pilot project in La
Macarena region, sharing many of the same characteristics.
The project is evaluated later in this article.
4Figures from the government of Colombia esti-
mate the number of internally displaced peoples in Colom-
bia closer to 3.9 million. The significant variation is due
in part to differences in methodologies. The Consultancy
for Human Rights and Displacement estimate of 5.5 million
people includes those who have been displaced on multi-
ple occasions separately while government figures do not
include those displaced because of government actions, such
as intraurban displacement, military force, and crop fumi-
gations (Mundt and Ferris, p. 5).
5In 2012, resources were committed to territorial
consolidation by 27 civilian institutions, including the Min-
istry of Transport; the Ministry of Housing, City, and Ter-
ritory; and the Colombian Family Welfare Institute
(“Informe de Gestión 2012”).
is coordinated with food security and techni-
cal and financial assistance programs that
ease transitions to the legal economy. Increas-
ingly, the emphasis of eradication programs is
on incentivizing voluntary transition (Isacson
and Poe, p. 37). Civilian agencies also conduct
social infrastructure investments to improve
education, health, and safety indicators to
national standards. Stabilization is the final
stage in which the institutional capacity of
municipal and departmental governments is
expanded and populations are further integrated
into Colombian society. During this stage, the
military begins a permanent transition of secu-
rity responsibilities to police forces as the
sequence is repeated elsewhere.
La Macarena Integral Consolidation
Plan: A Localized Success
Several factors qualified the Serranía de La
Macarena region of south-central Colombia as
the ideal area in which to test the theoretic con-
solidation model as a pilot program. For one,
the region has a storied history of government
neglect. For decades, guerrilla and paramilitary
groups were the only visible authority, bind-
ing local populations to the illegal economy and
stripping them of their civil rights. In the
absence of the state, the Fuerzas Armadas Rev-
olucionarias de Colombia (FARC) (Revolution-
ary Armed Forces of Colombia) even provided
infrastructure and services to strengthen their
influence (“Colombia: President . . . ,” p. 11).
In 1999, President Andrés Pastrana ordered
the creation of a 42,000-km2 demilitarized zone
as a means of facilitating peace negotiations
with FARC leaders, encompassing four of the six
municipalities in the Department of Meta, in
which the Plan de Consolidación Integral de
la Macarena (PCIM) (La Macarena Integral Con-
solidation Plan) operated (Kline, p. 55; DeShazo
et al., p. 4).6 The FARC proceeded to utilize
the vacuum of state presence to tighten its
grip on the region, exploiting it as a strategic
control point and economic base. Control had
been so complete that a guerrilla-run com-
plaints office replaced central law enforce-
ment (Mance). FARC’s influence had even
endured the dissolution of the zone in 2002,
as citizens had guerrilla-issued ID cards as
recently as 2005 (Isacson and Poe, p. 11).
Between 2004 and 2005, Meta was the largest
coca-producing department in Colombia, reveal-
ing the depth of the drug economy in the region
(“Colombia Coca . . . 2010”).
Beyond these factors, the region’s proxim-
ity (300 km southeast) to Bogotá and unique
ecologic features functioned as a symbolic
opportunity to solidify consolidation as the new
security and rural development doctrine
(Hartzell et al., p. 15). A limitless agricultural
market was underutilized by a region in which
agriculture was the clear engine of growth. (The
rural population in the PCIM zone is 2.8 times
that of the urban population [Salinas Abdala,
p. 5].) The economic potential of the region’s
three national parks (Sierra de La Macarena,
Cordillera de Los Picachos, and Tinigua) went
unexplored, functioning only as security lia-
bilities—not ecotourism destinations (DeShazo
et al., p. 4). Coca cultivation was destroying
not only the socioeconomic fabric of the region
but also its natural environment; for every
hectare of coca, 1.6 hectares of deforestation
occurred (Jaramillo, p. 8). Through the PCIM,
the Colombian government hoped to perma-
nently recover this ecologically and economi-
cally significant confluence of the Andes and
Amazon. The following sections analyze the
effectiveness of the consolidation model in the
PCIM zone. 
Security and Judicial Conditions
Intelligence maps reflecting security con-
ditions at the submunicipal level depict the suc-
cess of military operations in the PCIM zone
(Isacson, p. 13). Between 2007 and 2011, the
percentage of the territory in the recovery phase
was reduced from 80 percent to 46 percent 
(Balcázar, p. 8). In 2006, there were 220 con-
frontations between illegal armed groups and
military forces, although by 2009 this number
had dropped to 38 (“Diagnósticos por . . .”).
These data coincide with the expectation that
violence increases during the recovery phase
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6In 2011, the PCIM added the municipalities of Carta-
gena del Chaira, La Montañita, and San Vicente del Caguan
in the Caquetá Department before reorganizing as the
Macarena–Caguán consolidation zone later that year. This
article focuses only on those municipalities in Meta (La
Macarena, La Uribe, Mesetas, Puerto Rico, San Juan de
Arama, and Vistahermosa).
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Figure 1
Coca Cultivation in the PCIM Zone
Sources: “Colombia Coca . . .” [2010–2011]; “Cultivos de Coca . . .” [2007–2012]
and dissipates as the military weakens the struc-
tures of illegal armed groups. A series of civil-
ian surveys conducted by the United States
Agency for International Development Office of
Transition Initiatives in 2007 and 2008 reaf-
firmed this trend. Although rural citizens were
predominantly more negative about economic
and security conditions than their urban coun-
terparts, noteworthy improvements occurred
over the following years as a result of PCIM
investments (Hartzell et al., p. 10). By 2009, mil-
itary and police forces were permanently rooted
in each municipal center (Isacson, p. 6). More-
over, the percentage of stabilized towns in the
PCIM area increased from 9 percent in 2007
to 17 percent in 2011, signifying a rapidly
expanding region in which civilian agencies
could act freely (Balcázar, p. 8).
Despite these advances, threats to security
continue to impair the progress of consolida-
tion. Although the homicide rate in the PCIM
area decreased by 46 percent between 2006
and 2010, it remains 2.6 times higher than
the overall departmental rate and 3.7 times
higher than the national rate (del Pilar . . .). Cor-
recting this culture of violence will require more
than just military successes. The judicial system
remains similarly troubled as a shortage of judi-
cial officials restricts investigations to drug traf-
ficking and terrorism, resulting in impunities
that compromise the ability of Colombia to gov-
ern with legitimacy (Isacson, p. 12). As of
2009, there was only one judge per 28,200
people in La Macarena region, well below the
nationwide average of one judge per 12,500
(Molano, p. 10). Deploying critical judicial
resources will require reassessing the incentives
for professionals to relocate to relatively unde-
sirable consolidation regions. Until then, an
underdeveloped judicial system will continue to
compromise the rule of law. 
Coca Eradication
In La Macarena region, coca is synony-
mous with neglect. Legal crop production
thus symbolizes the level of commitment by the
government to this sparsely populated region
that has historically fallen victim to the influ-
ence of, and in some instances outright con-
trol by, illegal armed groups. Between 2007 and
2010, PCIM investments led to a 77 percent
decline in coca cultivation, outpacing reduc-
tions of 55 percent at the departmental level and
38 percent nationally (Figure 1). The negligible
outflow of coca cultivation from La Macarena
region to surrounding municipalities implied
that producers were permanently transition-
ing to alternative economic activities. Between
2005 and 2010, potential cocaine production
in the region was likewise reduced from 120
metric tons of pure cocaine (19 percent of the
national total) to 11 metric tons (3 percent of
the national total) (“Colombia Coca . . . 2010”).
These figures are widely cited to justify the
efficacy of consolidation as a counternarcotic
mechanism.
The success of counternarcotic efforts in
the PCIM area can be explained, at least in
part, by differences in strategy. Many producers
value shedding the stigma associated with the
illegal economy despite the reality that transi-
tions are unlikely to result in brighter economic
futures (Hartzell et al., p. 9). Consolidation,
therefore, emphasizes temporary food secu-
rity, technical assistance, and manual eradica-
tion in order to minimize economic and envi-
ronmental adversity. In 2006, only 15 percent
of coca eradication in the PCIM area was done
manually compared with 85 percent through
aerial fumigation campaigns conducted by the
National Police. A clear transition occurred as
consolidation advanced, however, with 62 per-
cent of coca eradication executed manually
between 2008 and 2009 (Mejía et al., p. 25). This
shift was much less notable at the national level,
as only 40 percent of coca eradication was per-
formed manually during the same period
(“Colombia Coca . . . 2010”). The PCIM was
attacking the structural causes of coca pro-
duction to achieve permanent reductions in
coca cultivation.
Alternative Development
Coca eradication is only a stage in the
process of transitioning coca-based economies
into productive facets of Colombian society. Cer-
tain resources must be available in order for
these transitions to occur, however, including
food assistance, technical training, available
credit, and navigable roads with access to mar-
kets. Between 2007 and 2009, 50 percent of
the COL$ 422 billion in PCIM investments
was targeted at infrastructure, including road
rehabilitation and construction projects that are
instrumental in connecting producers to mar-
kets and local populations to the rest of Colom-
bia (“Colombia Coca . . . 2010”; Hartzell et al.,
p. 20). During that same period, the cultivated
area of legal crops in the PCIM zone expanded
by 44 percent compared with a 9 percent
increase at the national level (Mejía et al., p. 31).
This differential suggests that such consolida-
tion investments were providing the necessary
resources for alternative development to occur.
A key challenge in La Macarena region will
be ensuring that the farmers who risked the
transition to the legal economy are the ones
who receive the benefits. A hectare of land in
Vistahermosa, a historically dangerous munic-
ipality in the PCIM zone, increased in value from
$270 in 2002 to $4,200 in 2011 (Hartzell et
al., p. 40). This increased land value puts height-
ened pressure on landowners to sell to large-
scale agricultural investors, further increasing
the concentration of land holdings. As of 2010,
49 percent of registered landowners owned 97
percent of titled lands in the Department of
Meta (Salinas Abdala, p. 19). It is uncertain
whether this concentration of land is cause
for concern or an acceptable consequence of the
upsurge in land values. Although the PCIM
has decisively enhanced security, reduced coca
cultivation, and promoted alternative develop-
ment with investments totaling COL$ 515 bil-
lion between 2007 and 2011, long-term issues
of judicial capacity and land inequality will
weigh heavily on consolidation efforts going for-
ward (“Colombia Coca . . . 2011”). I shift focus
from the applied aspects of consolidation to
its institutional framework at the national level.
The Institutional Framework of
Consolidation
2004–2010: Bureaucratic
Limitations
Consolidation was set in motion in 2004
with the establishment of the Centro de Coor-
dinación de Acción Integral (CCAI) (Center for
Coordination of Integrated Action) by presiden-
tial decree. The CCAI was given the complex task
of coordinating the action and resources of
public, private, and international entities to meet
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the needs of consolidation zone populations. The
presidential decree located the CCAI within the
Office of the Presidency and therefore gave the
agency a symbolic endorsement that avoided the
politicization of the legislative process. A direc-
tive council composed of two defense ministry
officials and the director of Social Action7 main-
tained direct contact with President Álvaro Uribe
while managing CCAI strategies (Devlin and
Chaskel, p. 5). The composition of the directive
council granted the CCAI military legitimacy and
high-level political influence, whereas a distinctly
social focus was supplied by a subsidiary execu-
tive committee composed of 12 agencies and
ministries deemed pertinent to consolidation,
including the Ministries of Agriculture, Educa-
tion, and Transport (Devlin and Chaskel, pp. 5,
7). The CCAI had successfully transformed con-
solidation from a military theory to a well-bal-
anced bureaucratic structure.
In 2004, CCAI investments were targeting
4 percent of Colombians across 12 percent of
the territory. By 2009, this coverage had
extended to 10 percent of the population across
20 percent of the territory (Devlin and Chaskel,
p. 10). Improved government presence coin-
cided with a reduction in the homicide rate 
in consolidation zones from 80.5 per 100,000
people in 2003 to 57.1 per 100,000 people in
2009 and a 36 percent drop in the number 
of incidents of forced displacement (“Plan
Nacional . . . ,” p. 24; Molano, p. 25).
While the political momentum of con-
solidation was producing results in targeted
areas, the limited institutional capabilities of the
CCAI were adversely affecting operations. Since
the CCAI was established by presidential decree,
it lacked an independent budget and had only
limited legal standing, inhibiting the agency’s
ability to engage key government institutions
in the consolidation process. The CCAI was
forced to lobby participating ministries to divert
resources from existing budgets without any
consequence for denying funds (Isacson, p. 5).
The Ministries of Education, Interior and Jus-
tice, and Transport declined to assign dele-
gates to executive committee meetings, suggest-
ing that consolidation was perceived as a dis-
traction by agencies with nonparallel objectives
(Devlin and Chaskel, p. 9). This incomplete gov-
ernment engagement compromised the mul-
tifaceted nature of consolidation.
Attempts made to correct these design
flaws were ultimately ineffective. A 2009 presi-
dential decree requiring government agencies
to honor CCAI demands and devote resources
to consolidation efforts was an empty threat
with no enforcement mechanism (Isacson, p. 5).
The CCAI had no political clout, with neither an
official budget nor consolidation-related budget
lines in relevant ministries (“Colombia: Presi-
dent . . . ,” p. 12). Although consolidation was
widely assumed to be the clear security solution
in Colombia, the government lacked an institu-
tional framework with the proper incentives
to execute it.
2010–2012: Rethinking
Consolidation
August 2010 marked a distinct shift in cen-
tral government leadership and the bureaucratic
energy behind consolidation. President Juan
Manuel Santos, a key proponent of consolidation
as Defense Minister, understood the urgent need
to improve the visibility and institutional struc-
ture of consolidation. The designation of con-
solidation as a high-priority item within 
the 2010–2014 National Development Plan—
approved by Congress in mid-2011—coincided
with a formal review process involving 60 gov-
ernment agencies to better integrate consoli-
dation as a permanent internal security and
development strategy (“Bases del Plan . . . ,” 
p. 561; Isacson, p. 16; “Waiting for Consolida-
tion,” p. 14). This reform process, begun shortly
after the inauguration of Santos, culminated
in the establishment of the Unidad Administra-
tiva Especial para la Consolidación Territorial
(UACT) (Special Management Unit on Territorial
Consolidation) in November 2011 as one of four
agencies within the newly formed Department
of Social Prosperity. Beyond replacing the CCAI,
the UACT would enhance the administrative and
financial autonomy of consolidation as an inte-
gral component of Colombia’s sixth largest min-
istry (“Proyecto de Ley . . . ,” p. 144). Consolidation
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7Social Action was an agency within the Office of
the Presidency that coordinated international and domes-
tic aid to victimized populations within Colombia until it
was reorganized as the Departamento para la Prosperidad
Social (Department for Social Prosperity) in November
2011.
had the independent budget and legal footing
that it lacked under the CCAI. 
While consolidation appeared to be devel-
oping as a key priority within the Santos admin-
istration, the political energy of the strategy
under Uribe had dissipated. Even though the
UACT corrected the flaws of the CCAI, firmly
structured plans introduced institutional rigidi-
ties that stifled creative thinking and limited the
capacity of the UACT to react to the rapidly
changing conditions in consolidation zones
(Isacson, p. 17). Mention of consolidation in
high-level speeches was less frequent as atten-
tion shifted to emerging priorities in land resti-
tution8 and peace talks (Isacson, p. 17).
Resources were being siphoned from consolida-
tion just as it was gaining designation as a
national priority. Between 2010 and 2011,
investments in consolidation zones dropped
by 61 percent, from COL$ 320 billion to COL$
125 billion (“Colombia Coca . . . 2011”). 
Consolidation operations were also jeop-
ardized by management turmoil. In Septem-
ber 2012, Álvaro Balcázar, an expert in rural
development and former director of the PCIM,
was asked to resign as director of the UACT
along with all of his top staff due to a failure
to comply with a trivial transparency require-
ment (Isacson, p. 17). Although the implications
of this management turnover on the progress
of consolidation remain unclear, the loss of con-
tinuity and experience during the pivotal early
stages of the UACT was certainly a setback.
The latest reduction in the number of con-
solidation zones from 15 to 8 is likewise a cause
for concern (García Villegas et al., p. 15; Unidad
Administrativa . . .). Although this reduced foot-
print may result in a more efficient allocation
of investments, it may also be indicative of 
consolidation playing a smaller role going for-
ward as limited resources are distributed to
fewer regions (Hartzell et al., p. 17). In terri-
tories where the UACT withdrew, expectations
were raised and populations again abandoned.
Consolidation zones were given the hope of inte-
gration with Colombian society and left with
only renewed risk of being controlled or influ-
enced by illegal armed groups.
Prognosis
Although the consolidation model is
inherently flexible, it is uncertain whether the
success of the PCIM pilot project will translate
to the unique environments of Colombia’s seven
other consolidation zones. Coca producers in
the PCIM zone valued participation in the
legal economy above the economic cost of tran-
sition. In regions with a strong culture of ille-
gality or where transitions to legal production
are even more difficult, consolidation may not
be a realistic counternarcotic mechanism. Pop-
ulations in the PCIM region also embraced
the presence of the state and viewed consoli-
dation investments as an opportunity to reduce
the isolation and insecurity of their communi-
ties (Hartzell et al., p. 11). Conversely, histori-
cally corrupt governments in consolidation
zones, such as Montes de María, have generated
strong distrust toward state institutions (“Wait-
ing for Consolidation”). This distrust creates
societies that are unwilling to be governed by
the state or integrated with the rest of Colom-
bia, severely restricting the potential impact
of consolidation. The possibility remains that
unique conditions in La Macarena region led to
the successful application of the consolidation
model. 
Two critical issues need to be corrected
in order to increase the likelihood of success
in other consolidation zones. The first is cor-
recting the overextended role of the military.
Consolidation hinges on the successful transi-
tion of control from military to civilian insti-
tutions as the security situation progresses. In
the Montes de María consolidation zone, the
military has been providing health services
and educating children, putting the military
at risk of being perceived as synonymous with
government (“Waiting for Consolidation”).
The risk of human rights violations is also
perpetuated when military forces operate along-
side civilian populations (Poe and Isacson, p. 4).
The consolidation process should be closely
overseen to ensure that military operations
are gradually phased out as civilian institutions
begin operating freely during the stabilization
phase.
The other pressing issue for both consol-
idation and the Santos agenda is the restitu-
tion of lands for displaced peoples. Land has
22
8The Victims Law, enacted by President Santos in
June 2011, seeks to return land to internally displaced
peoples and provide financial compensation to victims of
human rights infractions (“Colombia: Victims . . .”).
underlain Colombia’s continuous armed conflict
and added complexity to consolidation efforts.
The restitution of lands signifies a close to this
conflict, but this end is often distant in regions
where land is being returned. More than 80 per-
cent of Colombians do not plan to return to
the land from which they have been displaced,
citing poor security conditions as the primary
reason for their reluctance (Mundt and Ferris,
p. 7). Unless security in these isolated regions
improves, the vast majority of displaced peo-
ples will never return home. Consolidation is a
means of establishing sustainable security con-
ditions in regions where restitution is occurring
whereas restitution is a means of restoring com-
munities to their preconflict equilibria. Paral-
lel execution of restitution and consolidation
would increase the political profile of consolida-
tion beyond the zones in which it operates while
serving as a means to return millions of Colom-
bians to their rightful lands. The infusion of
political energy that would result from parallel
execution may be necessary to ensure that
consolidation remains the primary policy uti-
lized by the central government to permanently
recover ungoverned spaces.
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